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Abstract 
In the economics profession there is a fierce debate whether industrial and innovation 
policy should be targeted to specific sectors or firms. This paper discusses the welfare 
effects of such targeted policies in a third-market international trade model under 
imperfect competition. A theoretical case for picking winners through a preferential 
innovation policy is discussed, which is shown to hold without evoking retaliation from 
foreign competitors.  However, in practice information uncertainties remain a concern. 
The question whether in this case ‘backing winners’ is a wise policy option depends on 
the characteristics of the information asymmetries and on the extent the government is 
able to design selection procedures in a way to minimize the transaction costs that may 
be caused from the market participants’ opportunistic behavior.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Both in theoretical economic analyses and in the policy arena, there is a debate about whether 
innovation and industrial policies favouring certain industries or firms are welfare enhancing or 
not. For example, the “innovation platform”, a think tank organised by the Dutch government 
with the prime minister as chairman, has selected a number of economic sectors which are 
believed to have a key role in the knowledge economy of the Netherlands. These sectors will 
have some priority in obtaining support through government funding. This policy of selecting 
and consequently ‘backing winners’ was inspired by an advice by the Advisory Council on 
Science and Technology (AWT (2003)). Yet much criticism was raised against the selection 
procedure and the presumption that the government is able to predict which sectors or firms 
would be winners in innovation. For instance, Jacobs and Theeuwes (2005) asserted that it 
would be better to back ‘challengers’ instead of winners; however, without indicating how the 
government would be able to decide about these challengers. The Scientific Council for 
Government Policy, in a report on innovation policy, criticized the procedure of selecting key 
innovative sectors by arguing that backing winners may lead to protection of existing structures, 
institutions and interests (WRR (2008)).  The procedure excludes innovative outsiders indeed, 
which do not yet have the strength and size to qualify as winner. Moreover it is unclear why 
winners need government support anyhow.   
This paper discusses the options for a targeted industrial and innovation policy from the 
perspective of a strategic game among firms or sectors, where welfare effects of such targeted 
policy may stem from a cost reduction and industry-wide profit creation. Government support 
may take various forms and the usual debate around the benefits and the scepticisms of 
industrial/public/trade policies will all matter one way or another.  For a small open economy, 
in that most of the modern industries are exposed to the international competition, most of the 
government intervention will naturally take the international trade policy feature. While the 
conventional wisdom of laisser-faire is valid, in large part, under the idealized world of perfect 
competition, it has been identified that a strategic incentive to intervene with international trade 
under imperfectly competitive market structures may exist (e.g. Brander and Spencer (1983, 
1985)). Such shift in the theoretical stance was made from recognition of the interactive feature 
among the firms and governments, which is contrasted to the conventional economic reasoning 
based on the terms-of-trade advantage. The arguments received criticisms as well, which were 
mainly clustered upon the ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ feature and the possibility of a mutually 
destructive trade war. A unilaterally optimal policy may lead to distortion of international 
competition and retaliating responses may follow, in which case the policy has a negative, 
instead of the warranted positive effect on national welfare.  
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While the conventional discussions have been made around the structure of uniform – all the 
beneficiary firms are treated equally - policy, a non-uniform policy may further strengthen the 
strategic trade intervention incentives: the industry-wise aggregate profits can be newly created 
without affecting the other trading partners and therefore without the usual retaliatory concern. 
This new feature is particularly strengthened when a public policy aims to encourage the R&D 
activities by the firms.  Domestic firms can be unequally treated to create an asymmetric 
structure of the firms’ effective marginal costs. The restructured cost conditions among the 
firms then sets a new game rule for the firms to rationalize their output decisions, which may 
serve to save upon market-wise production costs for the benefit of the policy-imposing 
country’s profit improvement (Jo (2009a)). This profit creation can be sustained even for a 
technology without economy of scale, which is distinguished from the conventional profit 
creating argument in the literature which is valid only when economy of scale prevails in the 
production technology.  Also, since this new profit creation aspect of strategic R&D subsidy 
remains valid without affecting the other trade-involved countries, it is robust to the usual trade 
war concern. Also, it can be shown that such strategic benefits of a non-uniform R&D policy 
can enhance domestic profits even when the free trade is initially optimal. While the theoretical 
aspects of the new argument can be well-grounded, however, the practical choice of the policy 
details still remains questionable. For example, firms may take extra actions to be given a 
favour by the policy authority. It may create unhealthy transaction costs from the social welfare 
perspective without a visible countervailing benefit, whereas firms may take it as an incentive 
to economize upon their pre-policy cost conditions so that they can be picked as a winner group. 
In this respect, it will be critical to sort out the important factors for the success of an industrial 
policy while, at the same time, staying alert for the possibilities that the undesired negative 
effects may be caused. 
This paper aims to provide a theoretical and qualitative assessment of the pro and con sides of 
industrial policy so that it can give a hint under which circumstances and ways of organizing a 
targeted innovation policy of the government can be welfare enhancing. In the perspective of 
the policy discussions on whether and, if so, how to back winners – or challengers - the paper 
focuses on the dynamic game perspectives of an industrial policy which naturally exploits the 
own rationalizing behaviour of the private sector. Together with the potential rationale of 
backing winners, the paper also presents the issues for which a policy authority has to be alert 
for a successful implementation of such a targeted policy. In this respect, our analysis sheds a 
meaningful light on the on-going efforts by the government to bring about efficiency gains and 
a welfare improvement.  
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 illustrates the above-mentioned 
‘aggregate-profit creation’ effect of a non-uniform R&D policy and the theoretical justification 
of an unequal treatment of the domestic firms. This strategic effect is shown to be greater as the 
domestic firms are treated more discriminatorily. Section 3 then discusses the practical 
implications. The robustness and benefits of the idea of backing winners is highlighted and the 
issue of how to rationalize upon the cost-saving effects of an innovation policy is also discussed. 
Other benefits and concerns related with the incomplete information and the proper policy 
design are also addressed. Section 4 touches upon the distinction between the corrective and 
strategic objectives of a policy. It also indicates how a redistribution scheme may matter from a 
political economic concern. Section 5 contains concluding remarks. 
 
2. THE MODEL FOR THE BASIC RATIONALE 
This section presents a two-county two-sector third-market international trade model to 
illustrate that a country has a strategic incentive to introduce non-uniform R&D policies to 
create industry-wise profits without affecting the trade-related countries. This potential 
rationale will be used as the benchmark model to sort out the factors that may matter for a 
successful implementation of an innovation policy. The conventional case with the initially 
uniform R&D policy is reviewed first so as to emphasize its beggar-thy-neighbour feature, and 
then the aggregate-profit creation effect of a non-uniform industrial policy is discussed. The 
analysis leads to the main policy guideline, that ‘backing’ the right targets – both present and 
potential – should be the more important rationale than simply picking the winners when an 
industrial innovation policy is considered. 
 
The simplifying assumptions of the basic model are as follows. Each of the two countries, 
domestic and foreign, is endowed with a single factor of production, referred to as labor and 
denoted by L and L*, respectively, using which the firms produce a numeraire good and a 
homogenous oligopoly good. Consumers in the two countries consume only the numeraire 
good, which is produced under competitive conditions with constant returns to scale. The 
oligopoly sector in each country has n and n* Cournot firms and produces under constant 
marginal costs only to export to the third-market. 2 The trade is assumed to be balanced by 
implicitly assuming that the numeraire good is imported from the third-market in exchange for 
the export of the oligopoly good. The number of firms in the oligopoly sector is assumed to be 
fixed due to the existence of some form of entry and exit barriers. In this third-market 
framework, there would be no scope for an import-protective device. Rather, a government may 
                                                 
2 Domestic consumption of the oligopoly good and various returns to scale can be easily incorporated 
without affecting the main results. 
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seek to intervene with trade by promoting exports in one form or another. While this strategic 
aspect of an export promoting trade policy may be best presented through export subsidies, 
R&D policies will be considered here since the aggregate profit-creation effect to be 
demonstrated in the main sections below does not occur under export subsidies3, let alone the 
GATT Codes limiting the practice of the latter. Initially, only the domestic government imposes 
an R&D subsidy and it is assumed to be applied uniformly to all domestic firms. The case to be 
considered here is a two-stage game in which government decides upon a uniform R&D 
subsidy in the first stage, and the firms compete in quantities under the Cournot conjecture in 
the second stage possibly over more-than-one finite periods. 4 The time structure of the game 
here is different from a typical one-shot game or a conventional dynamic extension of it in that 
the cost-reducing benefit of an R&D policy is realized over time. The Cournot conjecture is 
only for demonstrational convenience and the main argument can be extended to a wide range 
of conjectural variations. 
 
2.1. Criticisms against the Conventional Uniform Policy 
Let xi and yj denote exports to the third oligopoly market by domestic firm i (=1,2,..,n) and 
foreign firm j (=1,2,..,n*) which add up to the total industry output Q. ci and cj* denote each 
domestic and foreign firm’s marginal cost and πi and πj* denote each firm’s profit from their 
third-market sales. Assuming the intra-country symmetric costs for the initial state, we have 
ci=c, cj*=c*, xi=x, yj=y, Q=nx+n*y, πi=π and πj*=π* for all i and j. Let s denote the uniform 
R&D subsidy to each domestic firm. Then, the after-subsidy marginal cost for a domestic firm 
can be defined as 
  ( ) (( 1) )k c S s s c n sα β α β= − − − = − − +                             (1) 
where S = ns is the total R&D expenditure by the domestic government. α (>0) represents the 
external cost-reducing effect spilled over from the R&D subsidy to all the other domestic firms 
and β (>0) represents the cost-reducing effect of the R&D subsidy to a firm on its own marginal 
cost. The spillover effect is assumed to work within the national border only, which can be 
easily extended to the case of an international spillover. Let P(Q) be the inverse demand for the 
oligopoly good in the third market. Then the firms’ profits are defined by 
      ( , ; ) ( ) (( 1) )π x y s P Q x cx n α β sx= − + − + ; *( , ; ) ( )*π x y s P Q y c y= −                          (2) 
                                                 
3 For a non-uniform export subsidy, aggregate profit creation is cancelled out by the increased subsidy 
expenditure (Jo (2009b)). 
4 For a more general three-stage game in which firms decide upon private R&D investments as well as 
the Cournot exports, see section 3.1.1. (iii). 
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and, considering that the cost-reducing benefit of the R&D subsidy is realized over time, say T 
periods, the relevant domestic welfare would be the following T-period discounted value of 
domestic labor income (L) plus domestic firms’ profits from the third-market (nπ) net of one 
shot government subsidy expenditures (ns) with δ being the discount factor:   
  1
1
( ) ( )
T
t
t
W T δ L nπ ns−
=
= + −∑ .                                                                                         (3) 
The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game is defined by the optimal subsidy s 
satisfying the optimization condition 
1
1
( ) ( 1) 0
T
t
t
dW T ds n δ d dsπ−
=
= − =∑                                                                             (4)                          
and the T-repetition of one-shot Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the second stage as follows: 
  (( 1) ) 0xπ P xP c n α β s′= + − + − + = ;   * 0,*yπ P yP c′= + − =                                             (5) 
Assuming that the usual regularity conditions hold globally,5 the global uniqueness of the 
Cournot equilibrium can be implied and a comparative statics reveals the followings: (i)  xs > 0, 
ys < 0, (ii) Ps < 0, Qs > 0 and (iii) πs > 0, π*s < 0 . We can further show that the positive optimal 
R&D subsidy which maximizes the national welfare WT  exists for large T and δ. 6  This 
unilateral incentive to offer a strategic R&D subsidy is consistent with the conventional 
findings: an R&D subsidy imposed in the first stage alters the firms’ strategic interaction in the 
second stage of the game and thereby makes domestic firms’ aggressive behavior credible in 
the market share rivalry, enhancing domestic national welfare even net of subsidy expenditure. 
This national incentive however is not confined to one country but reciprocal. It can be easily 
shown by considering the T*-period foreign welfare  
( ) 1* *
1
) )
*T t* * * * * *
t
W (T δ (L n π n s
−
=
= + −∑ ,                                                                           (6) 
with π* = Px – c*y +((n – 1)α* + β*)s*y and s*, α*, β*, δ*, T* defined analogously.  The foreign 
government’s unilateral incentive for an R&D subsidy is implied as well, and we can readily 
construct further details to conclude that the mutual R&D subsidies by both governments turns 
                                                 
5 The regularity conditions are: (i) P'' < 0 or not too much if positive, (ii) second order conditions for the 
firms ( 2 0xxπ xP P′′ ′= + < , 2 0*yyπ yP P′′ ′= + < ), (iii) x and y are strategic substitutes ( 0xy xP Pπ ′′ ′= + < ; 
* 0yx yP Pπ ′′ ′= + < ) and (iv) each firm is exporting a positive amount in equilibrium. 
6 As is well known through the other literature, the signs depend jointly on the relative sizes of n, n* and 
the sign of P˝, while the linear demand case is independent of these parameters.  A large n, in particular, 
induces over-competition among the domestic firms and may lead to a negative s.  For detailed proofs, 
see Jo (2009a) for the R&D policy case and Leahy and Montana (1998) for the export subsidy case: the 
working mechanisms of the policies are similar. 
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out to be jointly sub-optimal. 7  The skepticism of the prisoners’ dilemma phenomenon is 
reinforced and the trade war remains concern. 
 
2.2. Superiority of Preferential Innovation Policy to Uniform Policy 
The conventional discussion as reviewed above assumed a uniform subsidy. When an R&D 
policy takes a non-uniform structure, however, a new strategic feature can be drawn by which 
national policy authorities may be further motivated to intervene: an asymmetric treatment of 
the domestic firms through a non-uniform system of R&D policy may successfully manipulate 
the firms’ decisions and improve the national welfare, without affecting other countries, more 
than uniform policy accomplishes. In this section we illustrate this superiority of non-uniform 
policy to uniform structure. 
Suppose that the firms in each country have the same technology and thus share the same 
marginal costs. Assuming that all firms export positive quantities to the third-market, the 
uniform R&D subsidies s (≥0) and s* (≥0) with the first order conditions (5) will constitute an 
initial equilibrium.  Summing the first order conditions (5) across all the firms in the oligopoly 
yields  
 * * *( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0n n P Q QP Q nk n k′+ + − + = .                                                                       (7) 
When the demand P(Q) is non-convex or not-too-convex as assumed in the basic model, the 
implicit function theorem guarantees a unique Q. It is obvious then that the industry output Q, 
the price P and therefore the industry-wide revenue PQ all depend only on the sum of the 
marginal costs nk + n*k* but not on their distribution across the firms.8 This independence 
implies that a rearrangement of the initially uniform subsidies into a non-uniform way 
preserving the total subsidy expenditure does not affect the industry output and price, while the 
composition of the equilibrium output of each firm changes.  To prove, suppose that the 
domestic government redesigns the initially uniform R&D subsidy {s: ns = S} to {si: 
1
n
i is ns S= = =∑ } in a discriminatory way while the total R&D subsidy expenditure S is preserved 
and the new equilibrium still remains interior, where si  denotes the R&D subsidy to domestic 
firm i (if positive). For simplicity, the foreign subsidy is assumed to remain uniform. Then the 
domestic firm i’s marginal cost after the redesign becomes ( ( ) )i i ik c α S s βs≡ − − −  whereas 
                                                 
7 Given the joint global welfare *( ) ( ) ( )W W Wτ τ τ≡ +  defined at the equilibrium (s, s*) over τ periods, 
the implicit function theorem implies ( ) 0dW dsτ <  and *( ) 0dW dsτ < . Reducing the equilibrium 
subsidies improves the joint welfare. 
8 The observation that industry output and price in a Cournot industry are independent of the distribution 
of marginal costs has been noted and used several times in the literature. For example, see Bergstrom and 
Varian (1985), Salant and Shaffer (1999) or Bandyopadhyay et al (2004). 
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foreign firms’ marginal cost remains the same at k*.  The first order conditions after the 
domestic subsidy redesign change to 
  ( ) ( ) 0ix i iiπ P Q x P Q k′= + − = ,   *( ) ( ) 0*yπ P Q yP Q k′= + − = .                                (8)         
Since {si} is such that 1ni is ns S= = ≡∑ and the equilibrium is interior, the sum of marginal costs 
* * **
1 1 (( 1) )n ni jik k nc n S n kα β= =+ = − − + +∑ ∑  does not change. Then we have the following 
observation: 
 
Observation 1: ∆P = ∆Q = ∆(PQ) = 0, where ∆ denotes the changes caused by the domestic 
subsidy redesign. 
 
Now we will see how domestic firms rationalize upon their choices when the structure of the 
subsidy is modified. Denoting the initial outputs of the domestic and foreign firms by x and y, 
the following first order conditions need to be satisfied: 
  nikkQPxxQP ii ,...,2,1,0)()()()( ==Δ+−′Δ++ ,                                                   (9) 
 * * *( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0, 1,2,...,j jP Q y y P Q k k j n′+ + Δ − + Δ = = .                                                (10) 
Since Q remains the same and ∆kj* = 0, (8) implies that the above conditions (9) and (10) are 
reduced to 
 0)( =Δ−′Δ ii kQPx    
Since 0<′P , it follows that ∆xi and ∆ki take the opposite sign from each other and the 
following observation is implied.  
Observation 2:  The output of a firm experiencing a subsidy decrease will contract and the 
output of a firm experiencing a subsidy increase will expand while there will be no change in 
the output of a firm – either domestic or foreign - whose subsidy unchanged.  
 
Now we are ready to discuss the main feature of the arguments. 0=Δ=Δ=Δ jyQP  implies 
that the foreign and the third countries are not affected, allowing us to focus on the domestic 
welfare only. Since it also implies that the domestic firms’ aggregate revenue will not change, 
the industry-wide aggregate profit of the domestic firms will increase if and only if the 
domestic firms’ aggregate cost of production decreases. This aggregate profit gain to the 
domestic firms therefore will improve the national welfare. In the discussions below, we 
highlight this new feature of ‘aggregate profit creation’ of strategic non-uniform R&D policies, 
which comes through an asymmetric treatment of the domestic firms and its aggregate cost 
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saving effect.  This cost saving effect will turn out to be greater as the subsidies are redesigned 
in a more discriminatory way.9 From the first order conditions (8), the equilibrium output of the 
domestic firm i is given by PPkx ii ′−= )(  and the aggregate production cost for the domestic 
firms will be defined by  
  
2
1 1 1 1
1n n n ni
i i i i i
i i i i
k P Pk x k k k
P P P= = = =
−= = −′ ′ ′∑ ∑ ∑ ∑                                                       (11) 
Using the standard variance identity for {ki}, we can rewrite the above aggregate cost to 
 
( )212
2
1 1
1
n
n nii
i i k i
i i
k Pk x nσ k
P n P
=
= =
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟= − −⎜ ⎟′ ′⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∑∑ ∑ ,                                                         (12) 
where 2kσ is the variance of {ki}. Since P' < 0 and 1
n
i ik=∑ remains unchanged, the aggregate cost 
1
n
i i ik x=∑ decreases when the variance 2kσ  increases. Noting 222 ))1(( sk σβαnσ +−=  in which 
2
sσ  denotes the variance of {si}, we can conclude that the aggregate production cost of the 
domestic firms becomes lower as the variance of the subsidies becomes greater. Domestic 
aggregate profit increases accordingly and thus domestic welfare improves, which effects are 
greater as the domestic firms are treated more discriminatorily. The following corollary 
summarizes the discussion.  
Corollary 3: Suppose that the uniformly optimal R&D subsidy s prevailed and domestic 
government redesigns it in a non-uniform way so that 1ni is ns S= = =∑  and the new Nash 
equilibrium remains interior. Then, the domestic national welfare improves – more with a 
greater degree of non-uniformity of the subsidies – while the foreign and the third importing 
countries remain unaffected.  
The above discussions imply that a country may be attracted to heavily subsidize a few firms 
while accommodating the loss to the firms receiving lower subsidies through an appropriate 
national redistribution scheme. It is noteworthy here that the incentive for an unequal treatment 
of the domestic firms remains valid even when free trade was initially optimal and no ex-ante 
R&D policy was presumed. A detailed discussion is skipped but the necessary action will have 
to combine both R&D subsidies and taxes so that no new public expenditure is to be financed. 
The R&D expenditure and revenue can be cancelled out while the rationalizing behavior among 
the firms can create aggregate profits. Or subsidizing a few (or all) firms through a newly 
financed fund may be considered as well if the expected welfare gain is big enough to cancel 
                                                 
9 The intuition behind can be clearly highlighted when the initially-uniform subsidies are redesigned only 
across the two firms as illustrated in the Appendix. 
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out this subsidy expenditure. As an additional remark, the main argument can be extended in 
many directions including an explicit introduction of ex-ante private R&D investments as well 
as heterogeneous costs and non-Cournot competition modes, the details of which are discussed 
in the next section. 
 
3. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF BACKING WINNERS 
The analysis of section 2 shows that a non-uniform structure of R&D subsidies is superior to 
the usual uniform one. Whether the unilaterally optimal R&D policy was imposed or free trade 
prevailed as the initial state, it is asserted that a redesign of the initially-uniform R&D policy in 
a non-uniform way or a new imposition of non-uniform R&D policy leads the firms to 
rationalize their behavior in a way to create industry-wise profits. Since this welfare 
enhancement effect is strengthened as the degree of the non-uniformity of the firm-specific 
policy increases, this provides a country with an incentive to further strategically stimulate 
private sector decisions through an asymmetric system of the R&D policy.  
The main question, however, is about the practical implementation. The theoretical model 
assumes that the initial marginal costs (c) and the cost-reducing parameters (α, β) are the same 
for all firms. In case c, α and β are equal for each firm or sector, or when the government is 
unable to discriminate between firms or sectors with respect to these parameters, the policy of 
picking winners according to the analysis of the previous section boils down to throwing a dice 
to select the winners, who will obtain higher subsidies, whereas the others will lose. Obviously 
such policy is not feasible. First it will be legally not viable to select recipients of subsidies by a 
purely random selection mechanism. In reality, however, the parameters c, α and β will indeed 
differ amongst firms and sectors. In that case it seems reasonable to select those firms or sectors 
which have the lowest value of c and the highest values of α and β so that subsidizing these 
firms or sectors is most efficient. Then, the next questions are: how does the government assess 
differences in c, α and β in selecting winners to be backed and how do the firms or sectors react 
when the government is uncertain about the true values of these parameters?  
 From that perspective of practical policy implementation, the remainder of this section focuses 
on how to realize the benefits of the non-uniform policy prescription and it looks at what 
loopholes and caveats the policy prescription contains. The pros and cons of the discriminatory 
industrial policy naturally reflect the flip side of each other and a successful implementation 
would require one to sort out and highlight the key factors of the pro side and to pay extra 
caution to minimizing the con side. In that respect the discussion in the Netherlands on what 
innovation policy to conduct, with the innovation platform favoring a policy of backing winners, 
can act as reference case.  
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3.1. Robustness and Benefits of ‘Backing Winners’ Idea 
 
This subsection builds upon the theoretical insights sketched in section 2 to provide a thinking 
box for an innovation policy authority on how to select winners and on how this policy 
authority can economize upon the benefits of such a policy. The robustness10 of the non-
uniform industrial policy is illustrated first in order to highlight the superiority of a preferential 
innovation policy to uniform ones, when some of the assumptions of section 2 are relaxed. 
Then we extend our discussion to the issues that a policy authority needs to pay attention to and 
to be cautious about.  
 
3.1.1. Robustness of the Basic Rationale 
The trade model described above emphasized the benefits of creating an ex-post difference in 
marginal productivities through an asymmetric R&D policy. If the initial conditions were 
identical, then a government can simply realize the aggregate profit creation effect by 
redesigning or introducing a new policy to treat the firms unequally. If the firms’ productivities 
were different initially, however, the optimal form of R&D policy would have been asymmetric 
as has been well-documented in the literature (see, e.g., Neary, 1994; Leahy and Montana, 
1998; Kujal and Ruiz, 2007). Also, it has been pointed out that the optimal form of the policy is 
sensitive to the way firms interact.  In addition, when the private R&D investments are allowed, 
an asymmetric policy may affect the R&D cost, possibly counteracting the welfare gain. The 
basic rationale of the aggregate profit creation sketched in section 2 however can be shown to 
be robust to the above three concerns.  
(i) Heterogeneous Costs 
When the firms are of different efficiency ex-ante, the optimal subsidy will be naturally 
asymmetric from the beginning, favoring the more efficient firms.11 Suppose that the firms’ 
marginal costs are asymmetric and denoted by ci and cj* and thus the initially optimal R&D 
subsidy {si} and {sj*} are also asymmetric. We now consider a redesigned domestic – only 
domestic for simplicity – subsidy{ }is?  for which n ni ii is s S= == =∑ ∑?1 1  and the resulting new Nash 
equilibrium remains interior. Since the sum of the marginal costs ( )α β≡ − − −? ?i i i ik c S s s  and 
                                                 
10 Only the asymmetric cost case and various competition conjectures are reviewed in this report. See Jo 
(2009a) for the robustness to the other extensions such as various returns to scale in technology and 
‘international’ spillover of an R&D activity etc. 
11 It can be shown that the more efficient firm should be given a greater subsidy, which contrasts with the 
conventional ‘infant protection argument’ which favors a policy to help those firms or industries who are 
lacking in competitiveness. 
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j j j jk c S s sα β≡ − − −* * * * * * *( )  is preserved after the subsidy redesign, corollary 3 applies again 
and the aggregate profit creation effect is assured. The intuitive proof for an illustrative case 
that subsidies are rearranged at two firms is provided in the appendix.  As to be mentioned 
below, the existing finding that the initially optimal policy is naturally asymmetric and the new 
finding from section 2 that an additional gain can be created by further increasing the degree of 
non-uniformity of the policy reinforce each other to shed a light on the main policy argument of 
this paper – back the winners rather than encourage the losers.   
(ii) Various Competition Modes 
Although different characterizations of oligopolistic behavior would give rise to different 
policy suggestions (Eaton and Grossman (1986)), it can be shown that the aggregate profit 
creation argument as discussed above remains valid regardless of the specific form of the initial 
policy.  It can be illustrated using the conjectural variation parameters – developed by Bowley 
(1924) – following the convention in the literature. A firm’s conjectural variation is defined as 
the output response by the other firms in the industry that it conjectures would co-vary with its 
own output change. Assuming that all firms have symmetric conjectures, a firm’s conjectural 
variation is defined by v such that 1i jdQ dx dQ dy v= = + . We can ignore the case of 1−<v  
since it implies a pricing below marginal cost. And since the equilibrium was assumed to be 
interior, the case of 1−=v  can be excluded, in which case only the most efficient firm would 
export. Therefore we can only consider 1−>v .12  Now let’s consider a domestic redesign of the 
initially uniform R&D subsidy {s} to non-uniform subsidies {si} in a way that the total subsidy 
expenditure does not change i.e. 1ni is S= =∑ . Then the profit maximization conditions (5) after 
the subsidy redesign are modified as follows: 
 ( ) ( )(1 ) 0
i
i
x i iπ P Q x P Q v k′= + + − = ; *( ) ( )(1 ) 0*yπ P Q yP Q v k′= + + − = ,               (13)          
where ( )i i ik c α S s βs≡ − − −  and * * * * * *(( 1) )k c n α β s= − − + . The sum of these net marginal 
costs **1 1n ni jik k= =+∑ ∑  remains unchanged and corollary 3 applies. Substituting 
( ) (1 )i ix k P P v′= − +  from (13) and using the variance identity for {ki}, the domestic aggregate 
cost is expressed as follows: 
 
( )212
2
1 1
1
(1 ) (1 )
n
n nii
i i k i
i i
k Pk x n k
P v n P v
σ =
= =
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟= − −⎜ ⎟′ ′+ +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∑∑ ∑                                              (14) 
                                                 
12 As special cases, v = 0 would correspond to the Cournot case, v > 0 represents the conjectures about 
more aggressive behavior than Cournot, and v = n+n*-1 to the collusive case.  Note that there would be 
no aggregate profit creation effect under homogeneous product Bertrand case of v = -1. 
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Since 0>′P  and 1−>v , the above aggregate cost decreases when the variance 2kσ  increases 
and the aggregate profit creation effect is assured for a wide range of conjectural variations 
parameters. In the special case of 1−=v , the resulting equilibrium will involve corner solutions 
and only the most efficient firm is subsidized. In all the other cases in which the equilibrium 
remains interior, the aggregate profit creation effect holds true.  
(iii) Three-stage game with private R&D investments explicitly introduced 
The welfare-enhancing effect of the preferential innovation policy in the above has been 
explored through the cost-saving effects of the R&D process initiated by government. This 
assumption on the strategic benefits of R&D policy is made in order to avoid unnecessary 
complexity. However, the arguments can be extended to the practical case in which private 
R&D investments are explicitly introduced as well. This new three-stage game proceeds as 
follows: R&D policy is imposed in the first stage and firms make R&D investment decisions in 
the second stage and then output decisions in the third stage. Then given the uniform R&D 
subsidies (s, s*) and the R&D investments (r, r*)13 by firms, domestic and foreign profits are 
defined by  
 
* *( , ; , , , ) ( )π x y r r s s P Q x kx r= − − ; * * * * *( , ; , , , ) ( )π x y r r s s P Q y k y r= − − ,            (17)                
with (( 1) )( )k c n α β s r= − − + +  and * * * * * * *(( 1) )( ).k c n α β s r= − − + +  Suppose that the 
domestic government reforms the uniform initial policy to a non-uniform policy {si} such that 
1
n
i is ns S= = =∑ . This asymmetric policy would lead the domestic firms to alter their R&D 
investments to {ri} and the marginal costs after the new policy would be given by 
1( ) ( )nli i l i i ik c S s r r s rα β== − − + − − +∑  and * *jk k= .  Then it can be shown that a non-uniform 
alternative of the initial uniform subsidy with the sum of marginal costs  
* *
1 1
n n
i ji jk k= =+∑ ∑  
remaining unchanged exists when the firms adjust their R&D investments. Then corollary 3 
applies: the total industry production cost decreases while industry revenue does not change 
and aggregate profit and domestic welfare improve. Note that the R&D investments and the 
R&D costs are not treated separately here. However in many cases private R&D costs may be 
affected as the initially uniform R&D subsidies are redesigned in an asymmetric way. If overall 
private R&D costs do decrease, then the aggregate profit creation effect of non-uniform policy 
is further reinforced; however, if total private R&D cost increases, the aggregate profit gain 
would have to be weighed against the additional R&D cost incurred by the discriminatory R&D 
                                                 
13  d’Aspermont and Jacquemin (1988) show that, in the absence of research joint venture and 
government intervention, R&D investments at the first stage would be symmetric. 
  
14
policy redesign. The proof for the illustrative case in which the policy redesign is aimed only at 
two firms is sketched in the appendix. 
 
3.1.2. Implications for Backing Winners 
The unilaterally optimal subsidy in the conventional sense brings national benefits at the 
expense of trading rivals and thus the retaliation possibility seriously limits the practical 
applicability. A unilateral deletion of an on-going subsidy does not serve a national incentive. 
And a mutual reduction or deletion sounds ideal but is not self-enforcing due to its prisoners’ 
dilemma property or, even if agreeable, the operational or transaction cost involved – both 
visible and invisible – may amount to a non-negligible level. As such, a trade-intervention, 
once made, has a tendency of lasting for long. One way or another, an on-going policy can be 
justified and then, the theoretical model shows, a non-uniform form outperforms a uniform 
structure. If the trade policy authority failed to realize it and the current subsidy were non-
discriminatory, then the discussion of the previous section applies and the profit creation 
through an asymmetric policy can be sought for. A fairness argument for uniform subsidies 
might be raised but it should not necessarily be favored. Rather, a subsidy redesign had better 
be made in a way that helps those firms which are already cost-competitive.  That is, backing 
the winners has to be the more relevant slogan innovation policy should stick to rather than 
protecting the laggards. A policy of ‘helping loosers’ has, by the way, been abolished by the 
Dutch government after a parliamentary enquiry in 1983/84 which revealed the failure of such 
industrial policy in the late 1960’s (so called RSV-enquiry). However, unfortunately it again 
gained some momentum during the credit crisis in 2009, when worldwide protectionist policy 
measures in order to help domestic industries urged Dutch firms hit by the crisis to lobby for 
government support as well. In addition to the aggregate profit creation incentive, the idea of 
backing winners is further strengthened when the policy implementation process involves a 
mechanism through which the firms put extra efforts to improve upon their initial productivity 
to be eligible for beneficial policies. This may have been the intention of the Dutch innovation 
platform when it organized a beauty-contest-like process in order to select the winners to be 
backed, and be named as key innovative sectors. This point is discussed in a greater detail in 
later subsections. 
 
3.1.3. Degree of Industrial Competition and Backing Potential Winners 
As a caveat of the basic model in section 2, the argument of the model does not limit the degree 
of asymmetry in the way the firms are treated.  In an extreme case the policy may try and create 
a national champion so that some firms are forced to exit as the degree of unequal treatment 
increases further. The market may become more concentrated and the fundamental prerequisite 
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conditions for aggregate profit creation may be distorted. Not only the initially assumed 
uniform policy may be ungrounded but the strengthened market power of the exporting firms 
may also bring a detrimental effect to the trading partners, particularly the importing country, 
which may induce trading partners to impose a countervailing policy.  It is also true that 
optimal form of the initial policy even before the preferential rearrangement of it may be 
sensitive to the relative size of the domestic and foreign firms. Too many domestic firms may 
induce over-competition among the domestic firms, jeopardizing the potential welfare benefits 
from a subsidy, and too few firms may case anti-competitive market distortions. As such, the 
policy authority should make sure that the right degree of competition in the industry should be 
maintained and in this regard lifting entry and exit barriers is important. The dynamic benefits 
of the preferential innovation policy as contrasted to a uniform structure therefore hinge upon 
the idea of backing potential winners as well as the existing winners. In other words, the policy 
should be keen on also ‘backing challengers’, as advocated by Jacobs and Theeuwes (2005).  
  
3.2. Economizing upon the Cost-Saving Effects (α, β) of an Innovation Policy and 
Importance of  Commitment 
The basic rationale in section 2 relies on the following three key features: the ability of a policy 
authority to commit to a policy, the effectiveness of R&D in reducing own costs and the extent 
of spill-over effects. First, the commitment by government toward a particular policy and the 
detailed follow-ups of it constitutes an important part in the multi-stage game models. As a 
non-credible promise or threat does not constrain the choice of the other players of the game, 
the policy authority needs to commit to the policy to ensure the desired rationalization behavior 
by the firms. Therefore, the government policy which precedes the firms’ decisions should be 
tangible and official so that it effectively constrains the firms’ behavior. In view of the potential 
opportunistic behavior by the firms to be discussed in the following sub-sections, it is also 
important for the policy authority to commit to the follow-up programs if necessary.  
The case of heterogeneous marginal costs discussed earlier already shows how the policy of 
backing winners can be designed when the initial marginal costs (c) vary across firms or sectors. 
In reality, however, the spill-over cost-improving effect (α) and the own cost-reducing effect 
(β) of an R&D policy would also vary depending on to whom the subsidy is given. An 
asymmetric structure of α and β would be a norm rather than an exception, which case can be 
illustrated by the following marginal cost to firm i after the R&D policy: 
 
1,
n
i i ij j i i
j j i
k c s sα β
= ≠
= − −∑                                                                                             (15) 
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A higher αij means a higher spillover effect and a higher βi implies that a subsidy also improves 
the subsidy- recipient’s cost in a greater degree. And in the aggregate production cost (12), it 
becomes obvious that the policy authority can further materialize the welfare-enhancing effect 
by distributing the subsidies in a way that the firms with a higher β receive higher subsidies and 
those with lower β receive lower subsidies. By the same token, the firms that create a higher 
spill-over effect in terms of improving other firms’ efficiency are to be preferentially treated. 
The latter also implies that an industry which overall shows a higher spill-over is to be given a 
priority as well if selecting industries were the issue.  The ideal selection of the beneficiary to 
be backed by the innovation policies therefore could begin by looking at the sizes of α and β for 
the firms across the industries to select the right industries first and then apply a non-uniform 
structure of subsidies to the firms in those industries, again in accordance with the sizes of the 
parameters.   
 
3.3. Mechanism Design for an Efficient Monitoring 
The criteria to back the right winners are rather straightforward as summarized above. The 
more challenging issue is developing an information-gathering mechanism to sort out the firms 
based on their productivities (c), self-cost-saving effects (β) and spill-over effects (α). The 
government needs to utilize the existing data to derive detailed intuitions about these 
parameters before and after R&D subsidies were imposed.  And for a sustainable effect of 
welfare improvement, it is important to design and operate the mechanism through which the 
preferential selection of the firms be made in an efficient way. A well-designed mechanism 
may bring about an additional benefit to the economy by inducing the firms to take extra efforts 
to improve upon their pre-policy efficiency to be eligible for the subsidy rewards. On the other 
hand, the risk of rent-seeking behavior is present when the government’s discriminatory policy 
is designed upon the observed performances of the firms. Therefore a successful 
implementation of the policy has to be one through which all the agents get to internalize the 
costs and benefits within their own behavioral incentive system. Below we non-technically 
address such issues related with the informational details and the behavioral incentives of the 
firms. Transaction cost issues arising from the opportunistic behavior concern are also 
discussed. 
 
3.3.1. Incomplete Information 
One of the major skepticisms against an interventionism is that it presumes good information of 
industry details – cost, demand, the mode of competition etc. – on the part of policy maker. 
Policy authority, however, is only limitedly informed. The first natural observation is that firms 
would behave opportunistically in order to influence their entitlement to policy benefits. This 
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would particularly matter when the private R&D investments exist as illustrated in section 3.1.1. 
Over-investment can be a consequence. In such an incomplete information situation, a 
government may invent a policy menu combining a reward and a penalty through which the 
firms are motivated to reveal their true types so that the government can reflect on the actions 
taken by the firms to come up with the appropriate form of discriminatory policy (separating 
equilibrium). In that the uniform policy would be the alternative if the screening effort fails and 
the ex-ante private information were not revealed (pooling equilibrium), well-designed 
mechanism would be inevitable for a successful realization of the best welfare outcome.  On the 
contrary, a separating equilibrium is not always a better option than a pooling equilibrium due 
to the transaction costs that may arise for the former equilibrium. In this regard, a policy maker 
should pay extra attention to the details of the incomplete information when designing an 
innovation policy.  
 
3.3.2. An Additional Benefit of Inducing Efficiency Improving Efforts 
When the innovation policy is to be imposed in a discriminatory way based on the pre-policy 
efficiency level of the firms, the firms would take it as an incentive scheme and would try to 
enhance their productivity even before the subsidy assignment to the firms. A virtuous cycle of 
high productivity-high subsidy-high productivity will further separate the good firms from the 
bad firms, and the preferential subsidy mechanism can set a binding platform for this self-
selecting process. This additional efficiency-gaining effect is distinguished from the usual 
screening mechanism which is often useful under an asymmetric information situation. The 
latter solely aims to separate the good firms from the bad firms while the proposed R&D policy 
implementation mechanism would drive even the less efficient firms to put in their efforts not 
to further stay behind. That is, not only the separating equilibrium but also the pooling 
equilibrium may bring a welfare gain from the national perspective. To compensate those firms 
who improved in efficiency yet ended up receiving lower subsidies due to its lower-than-
average productivity improvement, the government may introduce an additional subsidy if 
available. 
 
3.3.3. Concern of Rent-Seeking Behavior and Other Transaction Costs 
However, when selecting the right firms is the central focus of the mechanism, the firms’ 
efforts to receive a high subsidy may lead the firms to behave to the selection mechanism only. 
The so-called rent-seeking behavior may prevail before the actual subsidy assignment. This 
rent-seeking incentive typically leads to the prisoners’ dilemma situation, in which all firms 
tend to behave only to be picked for a higher subsidy but with no practical contribution toward 
the meaningful efficiency improvement, yielding the socially undesirable outcome.  This 
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phenomenon can be clearly captured by designing a game in which the order of movements 
between the firms and government is reversed (see e.g. Gruenspecht (1988)). If the government 
assigns subsidies after firms take an action to signal their types in terms of their productivities, 
all the firms would have an incentive to over-invest for a lower cost to be eligible for a more 
beneficial subsidy. The subsidy assignment mechanism can help to mitigate such an incentive if 
the mechanism contains the self-adjusting system in which those who received a higher subsidy 
yet did not show a meaningful performance in productivity gain ex-post should be further 
penalized later through a lower subsidy. The plausibility of an effective incentive mechanism 
for the genuine cost-reducing efforts prior to the subsidy assignment can be seen through the 
framework of the repeated games in game theory. Firms would select to play opportunistically 
when the game is played only once or just a few finite times. But when the firms are conscious 
of the through monitoring mechanism in which the policy authority regularly updates the 
details, they will necessarily weigh the potential gains and losses from such an opportunistic 
behavior. In this regard, a deliberately designed follow-up program of the industrial policy is 
needed to manipulate the subsidy recipients to behave toward the socially desirable outcome. 
The productivity gaining efforts by a firm to be eligible for a higher subsidy could be exercised 
through a visible investment in new technology or penetrating into a new market for a higher 
scale economy realization. Or firms might seek an efficiency gain through non-tangible 
resources which had been available yet not utilized. All kinds like operational, technical and 
managerial resources might have not been optimally exercised and the R&D policy mechanism 
would induce the firms to reach their optimal utilization for all possible business areas. These 
all contribute toward reducing the transaction costs, which need to be counted as the positive 
feature of the mechanism.  The transaction costs can be saved on the policy authority side as 
well throughout the whole channels of sorting out the recipients – assigning subsidies – and 
monitoring the outcome for the next rounds of subsidy imposition. 
 
4. MISCELLANEOUS INNUSES 
4.1. R&D Joint Venture versus Adversarial Approach 
As another meaningful intuition, the relative size of α and β in (15) can shed a light on the 
debate about which policy between R&D joint venture – i.e. cooperation among the firms – and 
adversarial approach is to be adopted (see e.g., Neary and O’Sullvan (1999)). One concern 
about the adversarial approach is that it provides a firm an incentive to over-invest or under-
invest.  The former case matters if the spill-over effect is negligible and thus a firm has an 
incentive to more-than-optimally invest to give itself a strategic advantage against its rivals in 
subsequent product-market competition. And the latter case becomes real if the spill-over effect 
is substantial but is not fully internalized in the private decision process. As such, encouraging 
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an R&D joint venture could be an alternative option. Given the two-faced potential sub-
optimality of an outcome when adversarial approach was adopted, we can at least suggest a 
rule-of-thumb criterion on the matter: when the spill-over effects (αij) dominate the own-cost 
reducing effect (βi), an R&D joint venture had better be encouraged through which the cost-
reducing effect of an R&D policy will be maximized although the aggregate profit creation may 
not be obtainable. Otherwise, an adversarial policy through an asymmetric treatment of 
individual firms should be given a priority. It is noteworthy that the innovation platform, in its 
beauty contest to select the key innovative sectors in the Netherlands, very much favored those 
sectors where firms appeared to be able to present themselves jointly in the beauty contest. The 
implicit intuition of the innovation platform behind this design of the contest may be the desire 
to enhance future spill-over effects in addition to finding out in which sectors there already 
were joint R&D ventures.   
 
4.2. Corrective Objective versus Strategic Objective 
While the main part of our analysis focuses on the strategic objective of an industrial policy, a 
policy authority may also have a distortion-corrective objective in mind. In particular, in 
connection with the R&D activity by the private firms that are to be influenced by an R&D 
policy, the possible sub-optimality of the private firm level investment as discussed previously, 
might induce a government to try to catch both rabbits. Therefore, it has to be understood that 
the optimal form of the industrial policy – subsidy or tax – depends on which incentive 
outweighs. From a corrective policy perspective, a tax would have to be imposed if the spill-
over effect of an R&D subsidy causes an over-investment for a firm and a subsidy would be 
optimal if an under-investment is caused. Yet the optimal form of policy from a strategic 
perspective depends on the other factors such as consumer demand and the completion mode 
among the firms. If both motives reinforce each other, it is not a concern. However, if the two 
motives are counteractive, the relative importance of the two objects has to be well weighed 
before a preferential redesign of the policy is introduced.   
 
4.3. A Political Economic Concern: Redistribution Scheme  
From the usual perspective of positive economics, when there are winners and losers with the 
winners’ gain larger than the losers’ loss, an appropriate domestic redistribution scheme is 
necessary to ensure all participants gain. However, in light of the specific purpose of innovation 
policy, such as is the objective of e.g. the Dutch innovation platform, one may even leave the 
outcome as it is. In that way it can be utilized as an incentive scheme per se for the firms to 
improve their technology and cost conditions to further guarantee a higher subsidy. In a good 
scenario, the incentive scheme will lead all the firms in the industry to reach a higher efficiency 
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in absolute terms. If then, the subsidy redesign may rely on the relative measure of efficiency 
gains to reward only those with high efficiency improvement while those firms with a below-
average efficiency gain will still get penalized and receive a lower subsidy. A government may 
take another stance by rewarding all those with an efficiency gain yet in a discriminatory way.  
The firms’ efforts will be praised although unevenly. Of course such non-uniform policy of 
‘backing strong winners’ and ‘backing ordinary winners’ requires an additional fund for the 
subsidy spending.  The opportunity cost of the public fund will become an issue again, and the 
government will have to weigh all the related costs and benefits. The costs side would involve 
both the visible cost and the invisible transaction costs while the benefits should entail the 
screening effects in this asymmetric information environment to effectively distinguish the low-
cost firms from the high-cost firms as well as the usual cost-saving encouraging benefits. 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper discusses policy options for industrial and innovation policy using a new feature in 
strategic trade policy.  It illustrates in a theoretical case under an international oligopolistic 
market that a non-uniform innovation policy through R&D subsidies is superior to a uniform 
policy in its national welfare enhancing effect. It is shown that the usual retaliation concern that 
arises from its adverse welfare effects abroad does not apply and that the case holds true under 
a variety of behavioural conjectures among the firms. The theoretical argument is found useful 
in the debate on whether a targeted innovation policy is warranted in case the government is to 
‘pick’ or ‘back’ winners.  
Although the benchmark model was sketched in the ideal world with symmetric Cournot firms 
and it can be extended to the non-Cournot cases as well, the ex-ante asymmetric costs cases are 
more realistic and also the cost-saving effect on the firms or sectors of R&D subsides will 
rather be differentiated. It implies that the government will have to exploit a priori information 
on the differences of cost reduction that the R&D subsidy will bring about. That is especially 
true for the size of the spill-over effects which are positive externalities and may lead to under-
investment in R&D unless it is internalized within the system or through an industrial policy. 
The problem is that the government has incomplete information on the true initial efficiency 
levels of the firms and on the extent of cost reduction that the innovation policy will accomplish. 
Firms may behave strategically to impress the government, which could even lead to over-
investment and to rent seeking. Therefore it is required for the government to design a carefully 
deliberated strategy for innovation policy and show consistency in implementation of it. 
Nonetheless, the rationale of the aggregate profit creation remains valid as long as the policy 
maker can sort out the informational asymmetry to clearly configure the right form of the 
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optimal policy. Furthermore, it may bring about the additional benefit of inducing extra efforts 
on the firms’ side. 
From this perspective, our analysis discusses the various strategic issues for a targeted 
innovation policy with their pros and cons. It takes as example the strategy of the Dutch 
innovation platform, which designed a beauty contest in order to select key innovative sectors 
in the Netherlands following the policy proposals to conduct a policy of ‘backing winners’. 
Informational configuration about the current efficiency conditions of the market participants 
has to be preceded and also the potential efficiency-gains through the policy has to be well 
estimated, while the potential opportunistic behavior by the firms should be discouraged. A 
carefully designed mechanism to provide the firms the right incentives and also to monitor their 
post-policy behavior should be combined as well. In addition, the ‘challengers’ should not be 
completely isolated from the whole picture and the strategic details of the policy should entail 
backing the right winners – both existing and potential.  
As a final remark, we note that the analysis of this paper does, by no means, rule out the 
possibility that the ex-ante optimal form of the policy may be indeterminate or that the 
informational complexity may lead to a substantial transaction cost loss so that eventually it has 
negative welfare implications. The discussion of the policy options in this paper only has a 
qualitative character and is based on modern theory of strategic firm behavior.  A more fully 
fledged analysis would need a formal treatment of the specific strategies. Then a quantification 
of the net welfare effects that the optimal design of the policy strategies can bring about, is to 
be made. These net welfare effects may turn out to be positive, but can also very well appear to 
be negative. In other words, in spite of the theoretical model of this paper, which provides an 
argument for backing winners, in practice the cons of such policy may outweigh the pros. This 
is the scope for future research.        
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APPENDIX 
Proof of aggregate profit creation when the subsidies are rearranged only at two firms: 
 
A1. Homogeneous cost case in section 2.2. 
Suppose that the initially-uniform subsidies are asymmetrically rearranged only at two 
domestic firms, denoted by firm 1 and firm 2. Initially s1 = s2, k1 = k2 and x1 = x2s Assume the 
subsidy is reduced on firm 1 and raised on firm 2, preserving their sum. Then Δk1 >0, Δk2 <0, 
Δk1 +Δk2 = 0 and it follows from observations 1 and 2 that Δx1 < 0, Δx2 > 0 and Δx1 +Δx2 =0. 
Given this, we explore the following change in domestic aggregate production cost: 
  1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
(( )( ) ) (( )( ) )
( ) ( ) ( )
k k x x k x k k x x k x
k x k x k x k x x k x k
+ Δ + Δ − + + Δ + Δ −
= Δ Δ + Δ Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ                                             (16) 
In the above, the first term is negative since ∆xi and ∆ki take the opposite sign from each other  
and the second and the third terms are equal to zero because k1 = k2 , Δx1 + Δx2 = 0 and x1 = x2, 
Δk1 + Δk2 = 0, respectively. Therefore, the aggregate cost decreases and the aggregate profit 
increases. 
 
A2. Heterogeneous cost case in section 3.1.1.-(i) 
Consider a subsidy redesign only on two firms, firm 1 and firm 2. Suppose that the firms’ 
marginal costs and the subsidies were asymmetric initially and the subsidies are redesigned 
only on two firms, firm 1 and firm 2: 21 cc > and 1 2s s<  (thus k1 > k2 and x1 < x2 ) initially and 
subsidy redesign is made in a way that Δs1<0, Δs2 >0 with Δs1+Δs2=0. Then Δ k1>0, Δk2 <0 and 
Δk1+Δk2=0 and it follows from observations 1 and 2 that Δx1<0, Δx2>0 with Δx1 + Δx2=0. From 
(17), the aggregate production cost is 
 ( ) ( ) ( ).221122112211 kxkxxkxkxkxk Δ+Δ+Δ+Δ+ΔΔ+ΔΔ                                  (17) 
The first term is clearly negative. The second and third terms are also negative since k1Δx1 < 0, 
k2Δx2 > 0, |k1Δx1| > |k2Δx2|, and x1Δk1 > 0, x2Δk2 < 0. |x1Δk1| < |x2Δk2|. Hence the aggregate 
production cost decreases and the aggregate profit increases. 
 
A3. Three-stage game case in section 3.1.1.-(iii) 
Denote the cost to each domestic and foreign firm of investment r and r* by f(r) and f *(r*), 
respectively and suppose that the uniform subsidies (s, s*) prevails. Then, given (r, r*) and (s, 
s*), each domestic and foreign firm’s profit is given by ( ) ( )π P Q x kx f r= − −  and  
* * * *( ) ( )π P Q y k y f r= − − , where  (( 1) )( )k c n α β s r= − − + +  and * * * * * * *(( 1) )( )k c n α β s r= − − + + . 
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Suppose that the uniform domestic subsidy s is redesigned only at two firms – firm 1 and firm 2 
– into s1 and s2 in a way that s1 + s2 = 2s. Denote the new private R&D investments after this 
arrangement by ( , )= *r r r? : 1 2( , , ,..., )r r r r=r  is 1 n×  vector of R&D investments by domestic 
firms after the subsidy redesign where r1 and r2 denote new investments by firms 1 and 2, and 
* *( ,..., )r r=*r  is *1 n× vector of foreign firms’ symmetric R&D investments. Then foreign 
marginal cost k* does not change but the new domestic marginal costs change to 
1( ) ( )nli i i l i i ik c S s r r s rα β== − − + − − +∑ , where lr r= , 3,4,...,l n∀ = . Now let’s define Ψ  as the set 
of new R&D investments by firms 1 and 2 giving rise to the same sum of marginal costs in the 
production stage as follows: 
  Ψ ≡{(r1, r2): **1 1n ni ji jk k= =+∑ ∑ =nk + n*k*}.                                                                     (18) 
Then the implicit function theorem can be applied to represent r1 as a function of r2 for an r2 
within a neighborhood of r*: r1=g(r2) where g(r2) is such that 2 2( ( ), )g r r ∈Ψ .  That is, a non-
uniform redesign of the initial uniform subsidy can be found after which the sum of marginal 
costs does not change and the firms adjust their R&D investments, yielding an additional 
welfare gain. The aggregate profit creation argument remains valid. Note that the sum 
1 2( ) ( )f r f r+  may be greater than 2f(r) depending on how R&D costs reacts to R&D 
investments, in which case the aggregate profit gain should more than offset the R&D cost 
increase for a welfare gain.   
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